Security & Defense

Incompatible Needs: Denuclearization vs. Nuclear Deterrence

This article analyses how short term security priorities are forcing NATO to revise its nuclear strategy despite the West’s support for  denuclearization, arms reduction and non-proliferation.

This article was originally published by Atlantic Treaty Association here

On May 27th, 2016, United States (US) President Barack Obama used his visit to Hiroshima, Japan, to refocus the world’s attention on denuclearization, a project which has been Obama’s concentration since he took office, and which awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009.

Obama speaking at a wreath-ceremony with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial

President Obama spoke after a wreath-laying ceremony with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial on Friday 27 May, 2016. (Photo: Doug Mills/The New York Times)

The speech was deemed hypocritical as the US is currently heavily investing into the modernization of its nuclear arsenal, instead of reducing it, as the denuclearization guidelines would suggest. Washington has also supported the deployment of more nuclear weapons to NATO’s eastern front in response to Russia’s threatening attitude. Of course, some efforts have been made towards nuclear arsenal reduction, notably through the signing of the New START Treaty signed by the United States and Russia, but overall, Obama’s project has been stalling since it was first announced.

The discrepancy between discourse and action is not only visible Continue reading

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Ted Talk of the Week, The political use of...

The political use of fear

I decided that I would listen to a Ted Talk every morning while having breakfast. The point is to keep my brain going from the beginning of the day, but not necessarily on political or topical subjects. Every week, I will pick the one that made me reflect the most. I will post it here, and share my views with you.

Fear triggers creativity, “a constructive response” as David Rothkopf puts it. Other times, the result is not positive. The speaker details how 9/11 pushed the American to act out of fear and take disproportionate measures in response. Al Qaeda was at the time a small group of insurgents, whose ranks swole with the deployment of the international troops in Afghanistan and later with the US’s unlawful mission to Iraq. The response was thus wrong. The fact that the crises are still ongoing there proves that point. The American response was not appropriate and ignored the bigger trends, that of change and innovation. The response failed to incorporate those elements and the power of hybrid warfare.

OSCE, Ukraine and fear 

At the beginning of the week, I went to a conference organized by the Egmont Institute, where the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project presented their preliminary report on the situation in Ukraine, as mandated by the OSCE. The panelists discussed their achievements so far, all in agreement that something needed to be done in order to stabilize the region. The Russian representative, Prof. Sergey Karaganov, of course stood in opposition to the rest of the participants, calling for the right for countries to act as they please. This two edged-sword comment could be indeed interpreted several ways, as it is both positive and negative. Positive because it thus allows Ukraine to choose its own path, a path which was leading it towards the West until Moscow put his veto; negative because it also justifies Russia’s actions, its right to react when it feels endangered. This should make the West, and especially Russia’s neighbouring countries, feel frightened because there is no longer any certainty on how Russia acts, or how far they are willing to go in order to feel secure again.

Another panelist focused on the element of fear. Sir Robert Cooper, the British representative, called on the audience to take fear into consideration in regards to the situation in Ukraine. The crisis there is only one element of Russia’s strategy to protect itself and regain power in the region. And fear will make those standing against him, i.e. Western European countries and those wishing to partner with them, more eager to fight off Moscow in order to avoid a war on the Old Continent.

Let’s go back to the Cold War for a second: the reason why there was no direct confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was because both parties wanted to avoid a war in Europe (kinetic or nuclear) – the First and the Second World Wars at least had this positive effect. It was the fear that another conflict would tear Europe apart again which forced the use of proxy wars. Cmdr (Res) Kurt Engelen, in accordance with the work of Mr. Janis Berzins, rightly analyzes that we are indeed being constantly attacked by Russia. Combined with the fact that Putin declared, already in 2007, that his country was at war to stop the Western expansionism towards the East and South, we must take this into consideration and act upon it. This war which does not say its name is hybrid and indirect, but it is there. The situation is much more uncertain than during the Cold War because there is no tacit agreement by both parties that there would be no direct attacks. This time, the game has no rules, at least according to Moscow. The latter wants to change the status quo which is in its disadvantage as its former sphere of influence is slowly running away from it. We should fear the consequences of that ambition because we triggered it. And that fear should be the element which will push the endangered countries and populations’ forces together to combat the common enemy.

It is believed by some that only fear will make us react to the threats we are facing. But what if fear makes us act irrationally like the Americans did?

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